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The government published a four-page summary in Rossiyskaya Gazeta that revealed "stunning breaches of discipline, shoddy, obsolete and poorly maintained equipment",   and "negligence, incompetence, and mismanagement".
The bulkhead should have arrested the blast wave,  but in keeping with common Russian submarine practice, the pressurised valve in the ventilation system that traversed the bulkhead was left open to minimise the change in pressure during a weapon's launch.
The open valve in the ventilation system allowed the huge blast wave and possibly the fire and toxic smoke to enter the second and perhaps the third and fourth compartments as well.
Although the sub was at periscope depth with her radio antennas extended, no one in the command post was able to send a distress signal or press a single button that would initiate an emergency ballast tank blow and bring the submarine to the surface.
Two minutes and 14 seconds after the first explosion in the torpedo compartment,  the fire set off a second explosion of 5—7 combat-ready torpedo warheads.
Acoustic data from Pyotr Velikiy was later analysed and found to indicate an explosion of about 7 torpedo warheads in rapid succession. While the sub was submerged, 78 crew were normally assigned to the first four compartments and 49 to the rear five compartments.
In addition to the crew in those compartments, there were five officers from 7th SSGN Division Headquarters and two design engineers on board to observe the performance of a new battery in the USET torpedo, set to be launched second.
Anyone who remained alive in those compartments was killed by the second explosion. The government report confirmed that Kursk had been sunk by a torpedo explosion caused when high-test peroxide HTP , a form of highly concentrated hydrogen peroxide, leaked from cracks in the torpedo's casing.
HTP is normally stable until it comes in contact with a catalyst. It then expands 5, times in volume extremely rapidly, acting as an oxidiser , generating large volumes of steam and oxygen.
Its position, distance, and direction relative to the rest of the submarine indicated that it was deposited there as a result of the first explosion in that tube.
The fuel in the torpedoes carried by Kursk was inexpensive and very powerful. According to an article that briefly appeared on Thursday 17 August on the website of the official newspaper of the Russian Defence Ministry, Krasnaya Zvezda , Kursk had been refitted in —four years after it was commissioned—to carry torpedoes fuelled using the cheap HTP.
The article reported that some specialists in the Russian Navy opposed use of the HTP-fuelled torpedoes because they were volatile and dangerous.
The story did not appear in the print edition on Friday 18 August. Instead, the article was replaced with another that speculated the submarine had collided with an "unidentified object".
The change was likely due to political pressure. As head of the defence industries, over the objections of some officers, he had promoted use of the liquid-fuelled torpedoes over safer, more-expensive silver-zinc battery-powered torpedoes.
The government's final report found that the officers who had issued the order approving use of the HTP torpedoes did not have the authority to issue that order.
The dummy torpedo was ten years old and some of its parts had exceeded their service life. Several sources said that one of the practice torpedoes had been dropped during transport, possibly leading to a crack in the casing, but that the weapon was put aboard the submarine anyway.
Personnel who had loaded the practice torpedoes the day before the exercise noticed that the rubber seals were leaking fuel and notified junior officers of the issue, but they took no action because the exercise was so important to the Russian Navy.
Maintenance records revealed that the 65—76 "Kit" practice torpedo carried by Kursk came from a batch of ten manufactured in , six of which were rejected due to faulty welding.
An investigation revealed that because the torpedoes were not intended to carry warheads, the welds had not been inspected as carefully as welds on torpedoes carrying warheads.
When salvage crews finally recovered the remains of the torpedo and the launch tube, analysis determined that both bore signs of distortion and heat damage that were consistent with an explosion near the middle of the torpedo, very close to an essential welded joint.
The official conclusion of the commission was that a faulty weld had led to the explosion. In an emergency, personnel in the rear compartments were to move forward to the third compartment along with those in the forward compartments and enter a detachable rescue capsule in the sail or conning tower , which was capable of evacuating the entire crew.
The fifth compartment that contained the boat's two nuclear reactors was built to withstand larger forces than other interior bulkheads.
The reactors were additionally encased in 13 centimetres 5. The bulkheads of the fifth compartment withstood both explosions, allowing the two reactors to shut down automatically and prevent a nuclear meltdown and widespread contamination of the sea.
The fifth compartment contained the nuclear reactors and equipment that automatically recorded the operating activity of the boat.
Twenty-two recordings were analysed by specialists from the St. Petersburg Center of Speech Technologies.
They discovered that the system had been turned off the day of the accident in violation of procedure.
Kursk was equipped with an emergency rescue buoy on top of compartment seven that was designed to automatically deploy when it detected any of a variety of emergency conditions like a fire or a rapid pressure change.
Russian navy officers feared that the buoy might accidentally deploy, revealing the submarine's position to the U.
They ordered the buoy to be disabled and it was still inoperative when the sub sank. Despite the many lapses in procedures and equipment, Ustinov said no charges would be filed because the disaster was caused by a technical malfunction and blame could not be placed on specific individuals.
He said that all of the sailors had died within eight hours and none of them could have been rescued in the time available. At a news conference announcing the end of the official inquiry, he absolved the torpedo's manufacturer of any fault.
When Ustinov closed the criminal case without filing charges, [ citation needed ] family members were angry. Retired Russian navy Captain Vladimir Mityayev lost a son on Kursk.
He said, "To me, this is a clear case of negligence. While the official government commission blamed the explosion on a faulty weld in the practice torpedo, Vice-Admiral Valery Ryazantsev cited inadequate training, poor maintenance, and incomplete inspections that caused the crew to mishandle the weapon.
This led investigators to conclude that it was likely that the internal door was not fully closed when the explosion occurred.
It was known that the electrical connectors between the torpedoes and the internal tube door were unreliable and often required the torpedo crews to open and re-close the door to clean the connection before an electrical contact could be established.
Kursk ' s crew had not fired a torpedo for three years, and that torpedo was a much simpler battery-powered type.
This included cleaning the torpedo tube of lubricants, metal shavings, and dust that accumulate during long periods of inactivity. After the accident, investigators recovered a partially burned copy of the safety instructions for loading HTP torpedoes, but the instructions were for a significantly different type of torpedo and failed to include essential steps for testing an air valve.
The 7th Division, 1st Submarine Flotilla never inspected the Kursk ' s crew's qualifications and readiness to fire HTP torpedoes.
Ryazantsev believed that due to their inexperience and lack of training, compounded by incomplete inspections and oversight, and because Kursk ' s crew followed faulty instructions when loading the practice torpedo, they set off a chain of events that led to the explosion.
The Komsomolskaya Pravda tabloid published a report in June that senior officers in the Russian Navy had engaged in an elaborate deception to cover the actual cause of the disaster.
This referred to statements that the boat's captain, Gennady Lyachin , had sent a message to headquarters immediately prior to the explosion, "We have a malfunctioning torpedo.
Request permission to fire it,"  though it is unlikely that, as captain of the vessel, he would have needed to request permission under such circumstances.
The Russian Navy was later criticised as misrepresenting facts and misleading the public. The Guardian wrote in a review of two books, Kursk, Russia's Lost Pride and A Time to Die: The Kursk Disaster :.
The hopelessly flawed rescue attempt, hampered by badly designed and decrepit equipment, illustrated the fatal decline of Russia's military power.
The navy's callous approach to the families of the missing men was reminiscent of an earlier Soviet insensitivity to individual misery. The lies and incompetent cover-up attempts launched by both the navy and the government were resurrected from a pre- Glasnost era.
The wildly contradictory conspiracy theories about what caused the catastrophe said more about a naval high command in turmoil, fumbling for a scapegoat , than about the accident itself.
While most experts agreed that a torpedo had exploded, they differed on what caused the explosion. Many Russians did not believe that Kursk could be so easily sunk.
The tragedy spawned a number of wild conspiracy theories to explain the disaster. He said the weapon could have exploded only after an external event like a fire.
The sub was equipped with a special drain system that could rapidly drain hydrogen peroxide fuel from a torpedo into the sea.
If a temperature rise was detected in the torpedo tube, the torpedo would have automatically been ejected into the sea. In addition, any fire in the torpedo compartment would have triggered a powerful fire-extinguishing system that would have dumped "tons of water" on the fire.
It became the largest salvage operation of its type ever accomplished. Only seven of the submarine's 24 torpedoes were accounted for.
Salvage divers from Halliburton  first detached the bow from the rest of the vessel because it might have contained unexploded torpedo warheads and because it could break off and destabilise the lifting.
It took ten days to detach the bow. After the bow was cut free, the salvage crews raised several smaller pieces of wreckage. This included a piece of a torpedo tube weighing about a ton which was analysed to try to learn if the explosion occurred inside or outside the tube.
They salvaged a high-pressure compressed air cylinder weighing about half a ton,  to learn more about the nature of the explosion.
They also raised a part of the cylindrical section of the hard frame and part of the left forward spherical partition, to determine the intensity and temperature of the fire in the forward compartment.
Finally, they brought up a fragment of the sonar system dome. The ship was designed to carry huge loads on its deck, but Kursk would ride beneath the ship.
Giant 4 had to be completely modified to retrieve and carry the sub underneath. To raise the remainder of the boat, the salvage team planned an extremely complex operation that required them to design and build custom lifting equipment and employ new technologies.
They wrote custom software that would automatically compensate for the effects of wave motion due to the rough Barents Sea , which could sever the cables suspending the sub beneath the barge.
Divers cut a large hole in the barge's hull to allow room for the submarine's sail. Workers fitted the hull of Giant 4 with large saddles shaped to fit Kursk ' s outer hull.
They cut holes through the barge to allow 26 hoisting cables to pass through. The giant cable reels fed 26 huge hydraulic strand jacks , each mounted on a computer-controlled, pressurised pneumatic heave compensator powered by nitrogen gas that automatically adjusted for sea waves.
Mayo , a diving platform, was equipped with dive chambers to accommodate the dive teams. They worked in six-hour shifts, and when they were not in the water, the divers remained in the saturation chambers for the entire 28 days the operation took.
The salvage divers mounted custom guidance rings around the holes in the sub and lowered guide cables to each through the holes in Giant 4. The team then used the four guide cables to lower a custom-made giant gripper, similar to a toggle bolt , which were custom designed to fit each hole, and the divers manoeuvred them through the guidance ring.
The crew lowered 26 groups of hoisting cables, each capable of lifting tons, to the submarine and attached them to the grippers.
The strand jacks lifted the 26 hoisting cables and slowly raised Kursk until it was beneath Giant 4. On 8 October , fourteen months after the disaster, and only five months after the contract had been awarded to them, the salvage team raised the remainder of the ship in a hour operation.
Once the sub was raised and joined to the barge, it was carried back under the barge to the Russian Navy's Roslyakovo Shipyard in Murmansk.
Once in the dry dock, the pontoons were pumped full of more air, lifting Giant 4 and allowing crews to remove the lifting cables and detach Kursk.
The Russians initially intended to raise the bow from the sea floor—possibly containing undetonated torpedoes—but then decided it was too risky.
There were 24 men assigned to compartments six through nine towards the rear of the boat. But the ninth compartment contained a number of independent emergency lights, which apparently worked.
Kolesnikov wrote two notes,   parts of which were released by Vice Admiral Motsak to the media for the first time on 27 October The handwriting appears normal, indicating the sailors still had some light.
It's All personnel from section six, seven, and eight have moved to section nine, there are 23 people here. We feel bad, weakened by carbon dioxide Pressure is increasing in the compartment.
If we head for the surface we won't survive the compression. We won't last more than a day. All personnel from sections six, seven, and eight have moved to section nine.
We have made the decision because none of us can escape. It's dark here to write, but I'll try by feel. Let's hope that at least someone will read this.
Here's the list of personnel from the other sections, who are now in the ninth and will attempt to get out.
Regards to everybody, no need to despair. The newspaper Izvestia reported on 26 February that another note, written by Lt.
Rashid Aryapov, had been recovered during the initial rescue operation. The note was written on the page of a detective novel and wrapped in plastic.
It was found in a pocket of his clothing after his body was recovered. Izvestia quoted unidentified naval officers who claimed that Aryapov wrote that the explosion was caused by "faults in the torpedo compartment, namely, the explosion of a torpedo on which the Kursk had to carry out tests".
Izvestia also stated that Aryapov wrote that as a result of the explosions the submarine was tossed violently about, and many crew members were injured by equipment that tore loose as a result.
Analysis of the wreck could not determine whether the escape hatch was workable from the inside. Analysts theorise that the men may have rejected risking the escape hatch even if it were operable, and would have preferred to wait for a submarine rescue ship to attach itself to the hatch.
The sub was relatively close to shore and in the middle of a large naval exercise. The sailors had every reason to believe that rescue would arrive quickly.
The sailors were in a compartment that was initially at surface atmosphere pressure, so they did not risk decompression sickness 'the bends' if they used the rescue hoods to ascend to the surface.
But the Arctic water was extremely cold and they could not survive long in the water. Also, water was slowly seeping into the ninth compartment, increasing the atmospheric pressure and thus the risk of decompression sickness and death when they ascended to the surface.
In addition it was likely that some of the men were seriously injured and escape would have been very difficult for them. When the nuclear reactors automatically shut down, the air purification system would have shut down, emergency power would be limited, and the crew would soon have been in complete darkness and experienced falling temperatures.
There was considerable debate over how long the sailors in the ninth compartment had survived. Russian military officers initially gave conflicting accounts, that survivors could have lived up to a week within the sub, but those that died would have been killed very quickly.
The Dutch recovery team reported that they thought the men in the least affected ninth compartment might have survived for two to three hours.
But this fire was separate from that caused by the exploding torpedo. Captain-Lieutenant Kolesnikov, evidently the senior officer in the compartment, wrote a final note at in the dark, giving evidence that he was alive at least four hours after the explosion.
In any event, the Russian rescue teams were poorly equipped and badly organised, while foreign teams and equipment were far away and not given permission to assist.
While waiting for the boat to be brought to shore, a team of military doctors set up a temporary forensic laboratory at the military hospital in Severomorsk.
After Giant 4 was floated out of the drydock, water was drained from the drydock, exposing the Kursk's hull. Salvage teams cut into the compartments to drain water from the interior.
Ordnance teams removed the Granit cruise missiles and Stallion anti-ship missiles from outside the hull. On 23 October, two investigators and two navy commanders were the first to enter the hull.
The next day, 24 October, eight teams of investigators and operational experts began analysing the debris found inside the boat and recovering and identifying remains of the crew.
Salvage team members found a large number of potassium superoxide chemical cartridges , used to absorb carbon dioxide and chemically release oxygen to enable survival, in the ninth compartment.
Researchers concluded Captain-Lieutenant Kolesnikov and two others had attempted to recharge the oxygen generation system when they accidentally dropped one of the chemical superoxide cartridges into the sea water slowly filling the compartment.
The investigation showed that some men temporarily survived this fire by plunging under water, as fire marks on the bulkheads indicated the water was at waist level at the time.
But the flash fire consumed all remaining oxygen, so that the men still alive after the flash explosion quickly died of carbon monoxide poisoning.
Bodies recovered from the ninth compartment were relatively easy to identify. Those recovered from the third, fourth, and fifth compartments were badly damaged by the explosion.
These shocks would have immediately incapacitated or killed the operators. The sinking of the ship, the pride of their submarine fleet, was a devastating blow to the Russian military.
A year later Putin commented on his response, "I probably should have returned to Moscow, but nothing would have changed.
I had the same level of communication both in Sochi and in Moscow, but from a PR point of view I could have demonstrated some special eagerness to return.
Once the human remains had been removed and the hull had been thoroughly investigated, the remainder of the ship was transported to Sayda Bay on the northern Kayla Peninsula.
The two nuclear reactors were defuelled and the ship was cut up for scrap. Finally recognising the hazard of the HTP-fuelled torpedoes, the Russian Navy ordered all of them to be removed from service.
Putin accepted the resignation of Igor Sergeyev from his position as Minister of Defence on 28 March and made him his assistant on strategic stability.
He replaced him with Sergei Ivanov , who had previously been secretary of the Security Council of Russia. The position of Minister of Defence had always been filled by a professional member of the military.
Ivanov had retired from the military in , so his appointment as Minister of Defence while a civilian shocked the Russian military.
On 1 December , Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov presented a preliminary report to Putin. Ustinov wrote that the entire exercise had been "poorly organized" and that the probe had revealed "serious violations by both Northern Fleet chiefs and the Kursk crew.
Popov became a representative for the Murmansk region in the Federation Council, and Motsak became deputy presidential envoy for the North-Western Federal District.
When Putin dismissed them, he made a point of repudiating the collision theory. He had also been in charge of the rescue operation and follow-up inquiry.
In February , Putin removed him from his position as Deputy Prime Minister and made him Minister of Industry, Science, and Technology.
Putin dismissed the Northern Fleet's submarine commander, Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev,  : and in total removed 12 high-ranking officers in charge of the Northern Fleet.
Paradoxically, he said their dismissal had nothing to do with the Kursk disaster,   but that they had been responsible for "serious flaws in the organizations of the service.
As a result of the disaster, Russia began participating in NATO search and rescue exercises in It was the first time a Russian submarine had taken part in a NATO-led exercise.
President Putin signed a decree awarding the Order of Courage to the entire crew, and the title Hero of the Russian Federation to the submarine's captain, Gennady Lyachin.
Outside the port city of Severodvinsk where the submarine was built, a large granite slab was erected on the sand dunes. It is engraved, "This sorrowful stone is set in memory of the crew of the nuclear submarine Kursk , who tragically died on 12 August , while on military duty.
Petersburg, where 32 of the sailors were buried. On 17 March , journalist Tatyana Abramova from the newspaper Murmanskiy Vestnik found Kursk ' s sail in the yard of a scrap metal dealer.
The discovery sparked an outcry among citizens in Murmansk and they demanded it be turned into a memorial to the men who died. It was placed on the observation deck of the Church of the Saviour on Water in Murmansk, the submarine's home port and location of the Vidyayevo naval base.
It is among a memorial to sailors who perished during peacetime. On 31 July , divers representing the relatives of Kursk ' s crew and the Northern Fleet command placed an Orthodox cross on the floor of the Barents Sea at the site of the disaster.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Redirected from Dmitry Kolesnikov. Kursk Murmansk Oblast. Kursk Northwestern Federal District.
Kursk European Russia. Kursk Europe. Large October World Maritime Technology Conference, San Francisco.